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THE SCOPE OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION: United States v. Ross
On the evening of November 27, 1978, Detective Marcum had prob-
able cause to believe that a man of a particular description, known
as "Bandit," was selling narcotics from the trunk of a maroon
Chevrolet Malibu in the area of Ridge Street, Washington, D.C.' Later
that evening, Detective Marcum, accompanied by two other officers,
stopped a maroon Malibu driven by a person fitting the description
of "Bandit" in the area where Detective Marcum's informant had said
the car was located. After the driver had been arrested and hand-
cuffed, Detective Cassidy removed the keys from the ignition, unlocked
the trunk, and opened a folded but unsealed paper bag.2 The bag con-
tained thirty glassine envelopes of heroin which were introduced into
evidence after the defendant's motion to suppress was denied. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,3 sitting en banc, re-
versed defendant's conviction on the grounds that it was inconsistent
with the holding of Arkansas v. Sanders.4 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed the original convic-
tion, holding that when a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle is justified, the search may extend to every part of the vehi-
cle and the contents therein that may conceal the object of the search.
United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
Under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,
which protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures,
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, subject only to a few
exceptions.' The "automobile" exception was first enunciated in Car-
roll v. United States,' which held that an officer lawfully could con-
duct a warrantless search of a vehicle stopped on a highway when
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1. An informant telephoned Detective Marcum and said that he had just observed
"Bandit" complete a sale and "Bandit" had told him that additional narcotics were
in the trunk. The informant gave Marcum a detailed description of "Bandit" and stated
that the car was a "purplish maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District of Columbia license
plates. The informant had given Detective Marcum information in the past which had
been reliable and which had led to other drug related arrests. United States v. Ross,
102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1982).
2. A second search of the bag and a zipped leather pouch which also was found
in the trunk was conducted later at the police station. The search of the leather pouch,
which contained $3,200, was not an issue before the Supreme Court since the govern-
ment did not challenge that part of the court of appeals decision which held that the
contents of the pouch were inadmissible. Id. at 2161 n.2.
3. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
4. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
5. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
6. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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there was probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband
and the procurement of a warrant was not reasonably practicable.'
The Carroll doctrine was expanded in Chambers v. Maroney,' in which
the Court held that if probable cause to search was initially present
when the vehicle was stopped, the vehicle could be searched later
at the police station without a warrant. In the process of reaching
this conclusion, the Court stated that there was no constitutional dif-
ference between seizing and holding a car until a magistrate could
make a determination of probable cause and an immediate search of
the car.
In United States v. Chadwick, ° the government argued that the
rationale behind the automobile exception should be applied to a
footlocker which was seized in a railroad station, but the Court
rejected the argument, stating that luggage is not subject to the lesser
expectation of privacy which characterizes automobiles. Two years
later, in Arkansas v. Sanders," the Court declared that a warrantless
search of a suitcase, which was accompanied by no diminished expec-
tation of privacy, was unconstitutional, even though the suitcase had
been seized from the trunk of a taxicab. As soon as the police had
seized the suitcase, the exigency caused by the suitcase being in an
automobile ceased. Once removed from the car, the suitcase was like
any other piece of luggage seized in a public place, and it could not
be searched without a warrant. In Robbins v. California,'2 a plurality
of the Court would have extended the holding of Sanders by finding
that the (warrantless) search of any closed opaque container found
during a warrantless search of a vehicle was unconstitutional.'3
During the period in which the Court was expanding the
automobile exception, it was limiting other exceptions through restric-
7. Id. at 153-54, 156. In Carroll, the officers were not looking for the defendants,
but they knew that the defendants often transported contraband liquor in an Oldsmobile
on the road upon which the officers were driving. When the officers spotted the
Oldsmobile by chance, they stopped it and searched it, finding whiskey under the
upholstery of the rear seat.
8. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
9. Id. at 52. After the occupants of the vehicle were arrested, it was taken to
the station and searched several hours later.
10. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). A footlocker had been seized at a railroad station when
its owners were arrested on narcotics charges. The footlocker was then taken to FBI
headquarters and later searched without a warrant.
11. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
12. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
13. Having probable cause to believe that the station wagon they had stopped
contained marijuana, the officers searched its luggage compartment, and found two
oblong bricks wrapped in opaque plastic bags and taped shut. Upon opening these
packages, the officers found a substantial quantity of marijuana.
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tions on the scope" of searches pursuant to them. Specifically, a war-
rantless search was limited in scope to that which was required to
meet the need which justified the exception. This idea appears to have
been first expressed by Justice Fortas in Warden v. Hayden,'" in which
he said that searches under each exception until that case had been
limited to the extent necessary to fulfill the purpose of the excep-
tion. In Terry v. Ohio,'" the majority of the Court, quoting Justice
Fortas, recognized that searches which were reasonable in their in-
itiation could become unreasonable and unconstitutional if their in-
tensity and scope exceeded that which was necessitated by the justifica-
tion for the exception which allowed the initiation of the search. The
Court stated that the fourth amendment protects people as much by
limitations upon the scope of an intrusion as by imposing precondi-
tions upon the initial intrusion."
Terry limited the scope of searches under the "stop and frisk"
exception'8 to a pat down of the outer clothing when the officer
believed that the suspect might be armed. Such a limited search was
all that was necessary to protect the officer from weapons possibly
possessed by the suspect which was the justification for the excep-
tion. A year later, in Chimel v. California,'9 the Court limited the scope
of a search "incident to an arrest" to the area within the immediate
control of the arrestee from which he might gain access to weapons
or destructible evidence. When, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire," the
14. The word "scope" will be used in this Note to refer to the objects which may
be searched for, the methods of search which may be used, and the amount of time
and detail involved in the search.
15. 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring). In Warden the Court upheld
a warrantless search of a house for a man and weapons under the "hot pursuit"
exception. The officers who responded to a robbery call saw the man whom they had
been chasing run into a nearby house. Justice Fortas felt that the extent of the search
for weapons approved by the majority of the Court was not justified since the basis
of the exception was to prevent escape, not to collect evidence.
16. 392 U.S. 1, 17-19, 25-26 (1968). Terry created the "stop and frisk" exception,
under which an officer who has reason to investigate and who believes the suspect
is armed may stop him and conduct a limited frisk of his outer clothing for weapons
in order to protect the officer.
17. Id. at 28-29.
18. Two views have been expressed as to whether or not Terry should be viewed
as creating an exception to the warrant requirement. One view is that searches which
are not based upon probable cause, such as "stop and frisk" searches, were never
subject to the warrant clause of the fourth amendment and, therefore, such searches
are not conducted pursuant to an exception. The other view is that all warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment, unless they are justified
by an exception. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347, 357 (1967). Therefore, any
warrantless search which is constitutional must be supported under an exception. Under
this view, Terry creates such an exception.
19. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
20. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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Court refused to uphold a search of an automobile in a driveway as
incident to the arrest of a man inside his home, the majority21 of the
Court reiterated the rule that searches based upon exceptions must
be limited in scope to that which is necessitated by the justification
for the exception involved. Since the car was not within the area from
which the arrestee might gain access to weapons or destructible
evidence, the scope of the search exceeded that which was justified
by the arrest.2
The limited scope rule also had been applied to a search of a per-
son for evidence where no formal arrest has been made. When a
suspected strangler was being questioned voluntarily at a police station
and began to rub his hands together behind his back after refusing
to consent to the taking of samples from his fingernails, a very limited
search was allowed to preserve the evidence which the suspect was
obviously attempting to destroy." Since there was no arrest or stop,
the justifications for a search incident to arrest, for a search for
weapons, and for a search to preserve destructible evidence did not
necessarily apply, and a search of all areas within the suspect's im-
mediate control was not permissible. But since the suspect obviously
was attempting to destroy evidence, the "exigent circumstances" doc-
trine applied, and a more limited search was permissible to preserve
the evidence which was in the process of being destroyed.
The Court also has applied scope limitations to searches initiated
under the "emergency" doctrine. Although a fire provided an emer-
gency which justified a limited search immediately after the fire was
put out to determine the cause of the blaze and to prevent a reoc-
curance of the fire, the Court, in Michigan v. Tyler,24 would not sanc-
tion a continuation of the search without a warrant to gather evidence
after the cause had been determined to be arson. A shoot-out also
created an emergency which was sufficient to justify an entry and
a cursory search for victims in need of aid, but a four day search
21. Id. at 478. Justice Harlan joined part 1I-D of the opinion, giving it the support
of a majority of the Court.
22. [Ilt is doubtful whether the police could have carried out a contemporaneous
search of the car under Rabinowitz standards. For this Court has repeatedly held
that, even under Rabinowitz, "[a] search may be incident to an arrest ,"only if
it is substantially contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the im-
mediate vicinity of the arrest .... "' " These cases make it clear beyond any ques-
tion that a lawful pre-Chimel arrest of a suspect outside his house could never
by itself justify a warrantless search inside the house. There is nothing in search-
incident doctrine . . . that suggests a different result where the arrest is made
inside the house and the search outside and at some distance away.
403 U.S. at 456-57 (citations and footnotes omitted).
23. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
24. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
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of the scene which included ripping up carpets and digging bullets
out of walls exceeded the scope and intensity justified by the emer-
gency. The Court also has rejected the idea that an emergency in-
volving a serious crime necessarily justifies an extensive warrantless
search.25
Administrative searches also are subject to limitations on scope
which are commenserate with the justification for the exception to
the warrant requirement. A statute which mandated periodic war-
rantless inspections of underground and surface mines was upheld
because the statute specifically stated the frequency of the searches
and the areas which could be searched.' The statute also prohibited
forcible entry and contained provisions which allowed a mineowner
to-prevent any specific search which he felt was outside the federal
regulatory authority until the investigators procured a court order
authorizing the search. 7 Three years earlier, in Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc.,28 the Court had invalidated a section of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act which did not adequately define the areas which could
be searched or the frequency of warrantless searches. A statute which
authorizes warrantless administrative searches must delineate limita-
tions on the scope of such searches which will provide an adequate
substitute for the magistrate's determination of a reasonable scope
when a warrant is issued.'
United States v. Ross constitutes a reconsideration of the issue
of the scope of warrantless searches conducted under the automobile
exception. Justice Stevens, writing for a six member majority,"
reasoned that the authorized scope of a warrantless search based on
probable cause is the same as a magistrate could authorize when
issuing a search warrant, because only the prior determination of prob-
able cause by the magistrate is being waived when exceptions are
granted for searches based on probable cause. The search is other-
wise what a magistrate could authorize. Since the scope of a search
authorized by a magistrate is determined by the object of the search
and the places where there is probable cause to believe that the ob-
ject may be found, the scope of a warrantless search based on prob-
able cause also should be determined by the object of the search and
the places where there is probable cause to believe it may be found.
If a magistrate issued a warrant to search a vehicle, the scope of
the search would extend to all parts of the vehicle and any containers
25. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
26. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
27. Id. at 604-05.
28. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
29. Cf. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 603-05 (1981).
30. Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan dissented.
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therein which could contain the object described in the warrant;
therefore, the Court held that when a warrantless search based on
probable cause is conducted pursuant to the automobile exception, the
scope of the search extends to all parts of the vehicle and allows the
opening of any container found in the vehicle which could contain the
object of the search."
This holding necessitated the overruling of Robbins v. California
and the rejection of the majority reasoning in Arkansas v. Sanders
to the effect that as soon as a piece of luggage or other container
is seized from the vehicle and is in the officer's exclusive control, the
exigency which justified the initial intrusion into the vehicle and the
seizure of the luggage or container ceases and, therefore, the right
to search ceases. According to Ross, since a magistrate, in possession
of all the facts known to the officer on the scene, could have con-
cluded that there was probable cause to search the luggage or con-
tainer found in the vehicle and could have authorized such a search,
the officers could continue their search by opening and searching the
luggage or container. The Court, however, reiterated32 its earlier posi-
tion in United States v. Chadwick33 that the rationale justifying the
warrantless search of a vehicle under the automobile exception does
not apply with equal force to any movable container that is found
in a public place and believed to contain an illicit substance." Nor
does the mere fact that such a container has been placed in a moving
vehicle (where there is no chance for the contraband to be removed
from the container and secreted elsewhere in the vehicle) justify the
warrantless search of the container.3 5
The Court has rejected much of the reasoning of the majority
opinion in Arkansas v. Sanders and apparently has adopted that of
31. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
32. Id. at 2165-66.
33. 433 U.S. at 13.
34. The factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply
to respondents' footlocker. Luggage contents are not open to public view, except
as a condition to a border entry or common carrier travel; nor is luggage subject
to regular inspections and official scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an
automobile, whose primary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a
repository of personal effects. In sum, a person's expectations of privacy in per-
sonal luggage are substantially greater than in an automobile.
Nor does the [luggage's] mobility justify dispensing with the added protections
of the Warrant Clause. Once the federal agents [have] seized it . . . and [have
it] under their exclusive control, there [is no danger that it] or its contents could
[be] removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained.
Id. at 13.
35. 102 S. Ct. at 2166.
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the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger, in which Justice
Stevens joined. The majority in Arkansas v. Sanders held that
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to per-
sonal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it
applies to such luggage in other locations. Thus, insofar as the
police are entitled to search such luggage without a warrant, their
actions must be justified under some exception to the warrant
requirement other than that applicable to automobiles stopped on
the highway."
Justice Powell based this holding on the reasoning that once the police
have seized the luggage, the extent of its mobility is not affected by
the fact that it was seized from a vehicle and a person's expectation
of privacy in the contents of luggage is not lessened by placing the
luggage in a vehicle for transport." Justices Burger and Stevens,
however, said that Sanders was a container case which did not in-
voke the automobile exception at all. According to their reasoning,
the luggage being transported in the cab at the time of the arrest,
not the automobile in which it was being carried, was the suspected
location of the contraband.38 Such cases, according to Justices Burger
and Stevens, are governed by United States v. Chadwick, and the fact
that the suspected container coincidentally was located in an
automobile did not turn the case into an automobile exception case.
Therefore, they did not conclude that the automobile exception never
could justify a search of luggage found in a vehicle and that some
other basis always would have to be found to justify searches of lug-
gage seized from automobiles. They would have limited the holding
of Sanders to requiring warrants only where a suspect piece of lug-
gage which could not have been searched without a warrant was
placed in an automobile which the police did not otherwise have pro-
bable cause to believe contained contraband, 9 which is how Ross
limited Sanders. Apparently, the only connection between Sanders type
cases and the automobile exception is that the automobile exception
allows the police to stop a moving vehicle carrying the suspected con-
tainer and search the vehicle for the container without acquiring a
warrant to search the vehicle. The object of this automobile search
is the container and not the contents of the cdntainer; therefore, the
warrantless search for the container based on the automobile excep-
tion cannot justify a warrantless search of the container after it is
found.
36. 442 U.S. at 766.
37. Id. at 763-64.
38. Id. at 766.
39. Id.
19831 1567
8LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
As Justice Marshall suggests in his dissent, the analysis of the
majority opinion in United States v. Ross departs from the analysis
traditionally applied to scope of search questions under the fourth
amendment.0 The majority opinion makes no reference to the long
line of cases concerning almost every exception to the warrant re-
quirement which limits the scope of any warrantless search to that
which is necessitated by the justification for the exception under which
the search is conducted." The opinion also fails to discuss one of the
magistrate's traditional functions-to serve as a safeguard against
searches which are unreasonable in scope. If a warrant is applied for,
the magistrate can perform this function through a specific descrip-
tion of the object sought and the area to be searched. In the past,
the Court has limited the scope of warrantless searches in an effort
to provide substitutes for the safeguards provided by a warrant, while
accommodating the necessity for such searches under special
circumstances. 2 This effort appears to have been abandoned by the
majority in United States v. Ross.
The magistrate traditionally has performed at least two impor-
tant functions:43 (1) he makes a neutral and detached determination
of the existence vel non of probable cause and (2) he determines the
scope of the search necessitated by the governmental interests in-
volved and limits the scope of the search through a specific descrip-
tion in the warrant of the object sought and the place to be searched.
The majority opinion recognizes the first function, which necessarily
must be waived when a warrantless search is permitted. The reason-
ing of the Court, however, rests upon the premise that the object
and necessary scope of all searches, including all warrantless sear-
ches, already are defined precisely when the search begins." The object
and scope of searches based on warrants are defined precisely when
the search begins because the magistrate has defined them and record-
ed them in the warrant. For searches conducted under most excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, the class of objects which may per-
missibly be sought and the limits on the permissible scope of the
search also are defined precisely, but only because the Court has
defined them in judicially developed rules which restrict the objects
which may be sought and limit the scope of such searches to that
which is necessitated by the justifications for the exceptions. The
40. 102 S. Ct. at 2173.
41. See text at notes 14-28, supra.
42. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
43. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40 (1968); Katz v. United States, 382 U.S. at 347, 356-57 (1967).
44. 102 S. Ct. at 2170-71.
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Court, in the past, has substituted specific rules for the magistrate's
determination of the proper scope of searches pursuant to warrants."
Such specific rules, however, did not exist for the automobile excep-
tion, and the Court in Ross, unlike the Court in cases concerning other
exceptions, has chosen not to create them." The Court provided no
substitute under the automobile exception for the protection provided
by the magistrate's determination of the proper scope of a search.
The rule which the Court adopted is that the scope of a war-
rantless search based upon probable cause is no narrower and no
broader than a magistrate could authorize." The advance determina-
tion by the magistrate of the proper scope of the search has been
removed, and the determination of a police officer, whose view may
be unconsciously tainted by his desire to find evidence to justify his
actions,48 has been substituted. A substitution of the police officer's
determination of probable cause for the magistrate's neutral deter-
mination has been accepted under the traditional exceptions to the
warrant requirement because there appears to be no alternative. There
is an alternative, however, to substituting the officer's determination
of the proper scope of a search for the magistrate's neutral deter-
mination. 9 The alternative, utilized by the Court in the past, is for
the courts to lay down specific rules of scope which match the limited
justifications for the exceptions. When a lawful search has been in-
itiated, it is far more likely that it will not exceed reasonable bounds
if it is conducted pursuant to a judicial declaration of the proper scope
of the search." When this judicial declaration cannot be provided by
a magistrate because of the impracticality of obtaining a warrant, it
45. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
46. In Arkansas v. Sanders, the Court had begun the task of defining the scope
of the search under the automobile exception in such a way as to provide a substitute
for the protection of the magistrate's determination by reasoning that when the search
concerned luggage, the exigency provided by the automobile ceased once the luggage
was in the officer's exclusive control; therefore, the right to search ceased. 442 U.S.
at 763. In Robbins, a plurality of the Court would have extended the rule of Sanders
to provide a substitute for the protection provided by the magistrate's determination
of the permissible scope and extent of the search when any container was found dur-
ing the search of a vehicle under the automobile exception. 453 U.S. at 428. These
two cases represented the beginning of the process of creating surrogate rules for
the automobile exception, but the task was by no means complete. No limits had been
set upon searches which did not involve containers. The overruling of Robbins and
the rejection of the reasoning of Sanders by Ross undoes what progress the Court
had made toward creating rules which would provide an adequate substitute for the
protection provided by the magistrate for searches under the automobile exception.
47. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
48. The Court recognized this inherent problem with on-the-spot judgments by
police officers in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
49. Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18, 28-29.
50. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9.
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can be provided by appellate courts through rules of law limiting the
scope of warrantless searches to that which is necessitated by the
reason behind the particular exception.
Developing clear rules applicable to the wide variety of fact situa-
tions which may arise under the exceptions to the warrant require-
ment and which also provide substitutes for the protection provided
by a magistrate's neutral determination of the proper scope of a search
is a time consuming and difficult task. The Court, however, has taken
the time in the past to develop rules which provide substitutes for
the protections which a magistrate provides against overbroad
searches.
The Court has created rules which limit the object and scope of
stop and frisk searches to that which is necessitated by the reason
behind that exception. In Terry v. Ohio,"1 the Court limited the object
of such a search to weapons and restricted the scope to a pat down
of the outer clothing of a suspect. Since the purpose behind this
exception is to protect the officer and a limited patdown would reveal
any weapons, a more extensive search would not be justified under
the Terry exception. This rule also discourages overbroad searches
by substituting a court rule for the magistrate's judicial determina-
tion of the proper object and scope of a search.
In Chimel v. California,52 the Court created rules which protect
against overbroad searches incident to arrest by limiting the object
and scope of such searches to that which is required to prevent injury
to the arresting officer and the destruction of evidence. The general
rule, set out in Chimel, is that searches incident to an arrest may
include only the area within the immediate control of the arrestee.5 3
When special circumstances surrounding the arrest of an occupant
of an automobile required elaboration upon this rule, the Court, in
New York v. Belton,54 held that when the arrestee was the recent oc-
cupant of an automobile, the entire passenger compartment of the
automobile, including containers, could be searched. These rules
discourage overbroad searches incident to arrest in the same manner
that a magistrate discourages overbroad searches, by limiting the
object and scope of the search.
The majority opinion in Sanders and the plurality opinion in Rob-
bins appeared to indicate that the Court had begun to work on the
task of developing rules which would provide adequate substitutes
for the protections provided by a magistrate when a warrantless
51. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
53. Id. U.S. at 768.
54. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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search was conducted pursuant to the automobile exception. Sanders
had limited the scope of such searches by denouncing the opening
of luggage found during a warrantless search of an automobile. The
plurality in Robbins would have extended the holding of Sanders to
protect any opaque container found during a warrantless search con-
ducted pursuant to the automobile exception.
The analysis used by the majority in Ross, however, appears to
contradict the indication in Sanders and Robbins that the Court in-
tended to develop limiting rules for the scope of warrantless search-
es under the automobile exception. The Court's ruling provides no
substitute for the protections against overbroad searches provided by
a magistrate's neutral determination of the object and proper scope
of a search. Furthermore, as noted by Justice Marshall in his vehe-
ment dissent,55 by rejecting 'the reasoning of Sanders and overruling
Robbins, the Court undermined prior effects to limit the scope of searches
under the automobile exception and all other exceptions to that
which is justified by the purpose behind the particular exception. At
least in the area of automobile searches, a majority of the Court
apparently has decided not to pursue the effort to provide substitutes
for the protections of a warrant.
While Ross was an automobile exception case, the general rule
articulated therein and the reasoning behind it seem to have broader
applicability to all searches based upon probable cause and the im-
practicality of obtaining a warrant. Arguably, the same rationale could
be applied to searches under the exigent circumstances and emergency
doctrines, as well as any other exception for which the Court has not
yet articulated limiting rules. If this is the case, the Court may have
laid aside any attempt in the near future to provide further judicial
substitutes for the protections provided by a magistrate's neutral
determination of the object and proper scope of a search.
Mary Brandt Jensen
55. 102 S. Ct. at 2173-74 & 2176.
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